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JNTRODUCTION 
Some senior securities -- both bonds and preferred 
stocks -- possess a certain feature that other senior se-
curities do not possessr at the option of the investor 
they may be converted into a predetermined number of shares 
of common stock. If the market value of these shares 
rises above the price paid for the senior security, con-
version can result in a profit. Or, since arbitrage will 
cause the price of the senior security to rise at least 
as high as the conversion value, a profit can be realized 
by selling these securities~ 
Other senior securities do not possess this type of 
profit potential. The question then becomes, what price 
must be paid for the potential profit? 
But "cost" may not always be measured solely in quan-
titative money terms. Hencel depending on investor attitudes 
and objectives, a given.price may be dear to one yet cheap 
to another~ 
For the purposes of this paper, the "attitudes and 
objectives" that are relevant are assumed to be those of 
an investor whose primary interest is investment in senior 
securities. Convertibles are of interest to him as pos-
sible alternatives to non-convertible senior securities --
not as alternatives to common stocks~ Furthermore, it is 
assumed that this investor is a conservative investor~ He 
may be willing to include in his portfolio a senior secur-
ity with a speculative feature (such as a convertible 
preferred) under certain circumstances; but his primary 
interest in senior securities is investment merit as op-
posed to speculative appeal~ 
To come back to the question of "cost," then, what is 
the price that this type of investor must pay for the pos-
sible profit that a convertible preferred stock may provide? 
Usually, the immediate "price" of a convertible over a 
non-convertible is some sacrifice in yield or some sacri-
fice of quality or both. But the related question, "is 
the price too high?" is not so easy to answer. For this 
question really asks two questions at the same time: 1) 
will the price paid "pay off" in terms of eventual profit? 
and 2) how valuable is price appreciation relative to other 
objectives from the point of view of a conservative investor? 
The second aspect of the question "is the price too 
high?" - the value of price appreciation relative to other 
objectives -- seems particularly important. An investor 
in senior securities is willing to sacrifice the chance or 
higher income for greater certainty and stability of in-
come. This being the case, how much sacrifice of present 
yield and/or investment quality is consistent with this 
approach even if such sacrifice might be considered 
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reasonable in terms of the chances of price appreciation? 
Nevertheless, it seems theoretically possible that 
convertible preferreds might be available whose "price" 
in terms of sacrifice of yield or quality might be so neg-
ligible that an investor could include them in the senior 
securities section of a portfolio without seriously com-
promising investment objectives. If this were so, such 
an investor would be in a position to realize the profit 
that convertibles can provide. Yet if price appreciation 
failed to materialize, the investor would not be worse 
off than if he had not included. the convertibles in his 
portfolio~ 
The "thesis" of this paper will be that an investor 
of the above type ~ benefit from the profit potential 
afforded' -oy eonvertible preferreds without too serious a 
compromise of investment objectives, and that convertible 
preferreds ~ represent attractive alternatives to non-
aonvertible preferreds; At the same time, however, it will: 
be seen that in practice such opportunities are rare~ 
This paper is divided into two parts. Part One attempts 
to paint a somewhat broad brush picture of the various at-
tributes of convertible preferreds as a class of security; 
Frequent comparison is made between this class and non-
convertible preferreds to provide clearer definition; 
Part Two deals with the problem of selecting specific 
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securities from this general class and problems of manage-
ment once they are purchased. The various criteria o~ 
selection and principles of management are, of course, 
those relevant to an investor interested in alternatives 
to senior securities, not alternatives to common stocks. 
One final comment of an introductory sort is perhaps 
in order~ Convertible senior securities by their very 
nature offer considerable speculative appeal. Their often 
volatile price behav-dor makes them attractive from thia 
point of view, and they are often attractive as a hedge 
in times of market uncertainty. Part One, in dealing with 
the general attributes of convertible preferreds will con-
sider these aspects. Greater emphasis, however, will be 
given to those attributes of convertible preferreds that 
are relevant to their suitability as alternatives to non-
convertible senior securities from an investment point of 
view. 
Introduction 
PART CN.E - GENERAL ATTRIBUTES 
CHAPTER I - PREVALENCE 
convertible securities, including convertible preferred 
stocks, are by no means a recent phenomenon. Arthur s; 
Dewing writes: "almost from the beginning of corporate 
enterprise there have existed securities which could be 
changed from one fo:rnn into another."]. 
Prior to the Depressionl most data available about 
the usage of convertible securities deals with convertibles 
in general, and very little can be found that isolates and 
deals ~ecifically with convertible preferred stock; 
Since the Depression, however, availab~e data indicates 
that a perhaps surprisingly large percentage of preferred 
stock issues have been "converts."' 
Pilcher Study 
c·. James Pilcher made a study of all new United States 
corporate issues larger than $300,000 (excluding equipment 
trusts) issued during the period 1933 through 1952. His 
findings regarding convertible issues are presented in 
1A.s;, Dewing, Financial Polio~ of CorEorations. New 
York, Ronald Press, 5th edition, 1 53, Vol. !., p. 256~ 
Tabl.es I-IV. 2 
Perhaps the most signifioant fact for the purpose of 
this paper is the fact that 35.3% of all public offerings 
of preferred stock during the 20-year period were conver-
tibl.e. Of course, the percentage in the case of privately 
placed issues was only 8.2%.. Nevertheless, since less 
than one-sixth of total preferred stock offerings were 
privately placed, the percentage of total offerings that 
were convertible is still. as high as 31.8%. 
Also of interest is the fact that during this period 
the proportion of preferred stocks that were convertible 
was much higher than in the case of bonds. The proportion 
was four times higher with respect to public offerings 
and almost ten times with respect to total offerings. 
Table IV indicates the relative use of convertible 
preferreds according to industry grouping (public offerings 
only)~ Column (2) shows the percentage of the total number 
of convertibles accounted for by each grouping. Almost 
9~ of the convertibles were industrial issues. However, 
since a high percentage of total issues of preferred stock 
were industrial issues, more significant statistics are 
presented in column (4) which indioates the percentage of 
2Piloher, cr.J: Raising Capital with Convertible Secur-
ities. Ann Arbor, Bureau of Business Research, School of 
BUsiness Acpninistra tion, University of Mi chiga.n, 195 5 ~ 
Chapter II~ 
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TABLB I 
Public Offeringa;- Convertible Issues Relative 
To Total, 1933-1952 
( Offerings in Excess of 8300,000 Each and 
ExcludingEquipment Trusts) 
Bonds 
Preferred 
Stocks 
Total 
Number of 
Offerings 
1,959 
1,399 
Total Senior 
Issues 3,358 
Number of 
Convertible 
Offerings 
182 
494 
676 
Per Cent 
Convertible 
9.3 
35.J 
20.1 
Source:, Reproduction of table in Raising Capital with 
Convertible Securities by c. J. PilCher. 
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TABLE II 
Private Placements; Convertible Issues 
Relative to Total, 1933-1952 
(Offerings in Excess of 3300,000 Each and 
Excluding Equipment Trusts) 
Total 
Number of 
Offerings 
Number of 
Convertible 
Offerings 
Per Cent 
Convertible 
Bonds 
Preferred 
Stocks 
Total Senior 
Issues 
3,914 
208 
4,122 
21 0.5 
8.2 
38 0.9 
Source: Reproduction of table in Raising Capital with 
Convertible Securities by C. J. Pilcher. 
TABLE. III 
Tota1 Public and Private Placements; Convertible 
Issues Relative to Total, 1933-1952 
{Offerings in Excess of $300,000 Each and 
Excluding Equipment Trusts) 
Bonds 
Preferred 
Stocks 
Total 
Number of 
Offerings 
5,873 
1,607 
Number of 
Convertible 
Offerings 
203 
511 
Per Cent 
Convertible 
31.8 
Source: Reproduction of table in Raising capital with 
Convertible Securities by c. J. Pilcher. 
TABLE rr 
Industry Use of Convertib1e Preferred Stock~ 1933-1952 
(Public Offerings in Excess of $300t000 Each 
Excluding Equipment Trusts) 
(1) ( 2) ( 3) (4) 
Number of Percentage Total Percentage 
Convertible of Total Number. of of Total 
Offerings Convertible Off.erings Offerings 
(1) • 494 (1) + (3) 
Industrials 438 88,7 931 47.1 
Uti11ties 49 9.9 4~7 10.9 
Rail.roads 1 0.2 1 100.0 
Banks 2 0.4 7 28.6 
Insurance 
Companies 4 0.8 13 30.8 
494, 100~0 1,399 35.6 
Source: Derived from two tables in Raisin~ Capital with 
Convertib1e Securities by c. J. Pilcher. 
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preferreds in each grouping that were convertible. The 
100% figure for "Railroads" can perhaps be ignored due to 
the fact that there was only one issue in this grouping~ 
On this basis, the industrial grouping exhibited the high-
est percentage -- 47.1% --and utilities the lowest --
10.9%. 
The most significant aspect of Table IV seems to be 
the high proportion of industrial preferreds that were 
convertible -- almost 1 out of every 2~ 
Thus, in summary, the Pilcher study indicates the fol-
lowing about the relative usage of convertible preferred 
stocks during the 20-year period 1933-1952: 
1~ 31.8% of all issues of preferred stock were 
convertible. 
2. 35.3% of all public offerings of preferred stock 
were convertible (87% of total offerings were public 
offerings). 
3. 47.1% of all public preferred stock offerings 
of industrial companies were convertible (industrial of-
ferings accounted for 66.5% of total public offerings). 
4. The proportion of public offerings of preferred 
stock that were convertible was four times higher than 
the proportion of bonds that were convertible; 
11 
S.tudy of convertible preferred stock issues 1957-1961. 
To compare the findings of the Pilcher study with 
statistics from a more recent period, a study was made of 
all public offerings of preferred stock in the 5-year per-
iod, 1957 through 1961. This study did not exclude issues 
under $300,000 and did not exclude equipment trusts as in 
the case of the Pilcher study. The basic source of this 
study was the rrcorporate Financing Directory" of the In-
vestment Dealers• Digest for the years 1957-61~3 
The findings of this study are summarized in Table V~ 
As this table indicates, 41% of the public offerings of 
preferred stock during the period were convertible issues~ 
Since issues of under $300,000 were included in this study, 
the results of the study are not directly comparable with 
the Pilcher study. But some comparison is possible; for 
if it is not possible to conclude with certainty that the 
usage of convertibles has increased, it would nevertheless 
seem safe to conclude that popularity of convertibility 
has not decreased since the 1933-1952 period~ 
Study of preferred stock.s listed on the New York or American 
Stock Exchanges as of April 161 1962; 
A study of the preferred stocks listed on the New York 
3corporate Financing Directory •. Investment Dealers' 
Digest, Jan. 27, 19.57, Jan. 261 1959, Feb. l, l96o, Feb~ 6, 
1961, Feb. 5, 1962~ 
12 
TABLE V 
Public Offerings; Convertible Preferred Stock 
Issues Relative to Total, 1957-1961. 
Total Number 
of 
Offerings 
262 
Number of 
Convertible 
Offerings 
108 
Source: Investment Dealers• Digest 
Per Cent 
Convertible 
41 
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or American Stock Exchanges was made to determine the pro-
portion that were convertible. The basic source for this 
study was the "Independent Appraisals Section" of Financial 
World Magazine.~ The results of this study are presented 
in Table VI. 
Approximately one-fifth of the "listed" stocks were 
convertibles. This proportion is somewhat lower than 
the proportion of covertibles among total public offer-
ings during the 1957-1961 period. This difference would 
seen to suggest that larger, listed companies may issue 
convertibles to a lesser extent than smaller, unlisted 
companies. However, part of the difference (and perhaps 
all of the difference) oan be explained in a different 
way. Convertible securities, being convertible, have a 
shorter life-span than non-convertibles. Consequently, 
any listing of securities outstanding as of a given date 
is likely to include a lower proportion of convertible 
issues than a listing of securities issued during some 
previous period~ 
~Independent Appraisals Section, Financial Worldl 
May 2, 1962. 
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TABLE VI 
Outstanding Issues of Preferred Stock Listed on the 
New York or American Stock Exchanges; Convertible 
Issues Relative to Total, April 16, 1962 
Total Number 
of 
Issues Listed 
442 
Number of 
Convertibles 
Listed 
86 
Source: Financial World Magazine 
Per Cent 
Convertible 
19.4-
15 
CHAPTER II - BA.SIC CHARACTERISTICS OF F.ORM 
Chapter I indicated that a sizeable proportion of 
preferred stocks are "converts." This chapter will look 
more closely at these "converts" with the purpose of set-
ting forth the basic characteristics of their form.* 
Type of security obtainable by conversion. 
By and large cnnvertible preferred stocks are con-
vertible into common stock and into common stock of the 
same company.** 
conversi.on Price or Ratio. 
There are two ways in which the amount of common 
stock*** obtainable by conversion is specified in the con-
vertible preferred stock contract. 
The first method states a conversion price for the 
common stock. This dollar price is the dollar amount o~ 
*A general source of this chapter will ~e Pilcher, 
Raising Capital with Convertible securities. 
**An exception to the latter is exhibited by Owens-
Illinois Glass $4 C~nvertible Preferred which is convertible 
into the common stock of Owens-corning Fiberglass. 
***Unless otherwise noted, the assumption is made that 
the security obtainable by conversion is common stock~ As 
mentioned above, this is the typica;J.. situation~ 
5Pilcher, c. J., ££• ~., ch. III~ 
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par or stated value of the preferred stock that must be 
given in exchange for one share of common stock. For ex-
ampl.e, Minneapolis-Honeywell 3% Convertible Preferred 
Stock (Par = $100) is convertible into common at $180·~ 
Since the par value of the preferred is $100, a holder 
of 18 shares of the preferred could convert these shares 
into 10 shares of common stock ($100 times 18 = $1800 ~ 
$1800 + $180 = 10)~ 
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The second method expresses the amount of common stock 
obtainable by conversion in ratio form. One share of the 
preferred is specified as being convertible into a certain 
number of shares of common. For example, Standard Oil of 
California $3.30 Convertible Preferred (No Par) is conver-
tible into common stock at the rate of 1.30 shares of 
common for each share of the preferred. 
Constant vs. Changing Conversion Price or Ratio 
The majority of convertible preferreds have a constant 
conversion ratio or price. A study was made of 97 indus- -
trial and utility convertible preferred stocks outstanding 
in 1962. The source for this study was a listing of con-
vertible stocks published by Spencer, Trask & Co~ 6 As 
6Preferred Stocks -- Industrial and Public Utility 
Issues. New York, Spencer, Trask & Co., 1962. 
tabulated in Table VII, 77% of these stocks had constant 
conversion terms. A study made by Pilcher of 73 conver-
tible preferred stocks which were issued in the period 
1948-19527 indicated that 82% had constant conversion 
terms. (See Table VIII). An example of a convertible pre-
ferred having constant conversion terms is the Standard Oil 
of California 33.30 Convertible Preferred referred to 
above. It is convertible into 1.31 shares of common at any 
time. 
On the basis of the two studies referred to above, 
around one-fifth of convertible preferred stocks have chang-
ing conversion terms. The typical contract of this type 
specifies that as of a certain date or dates in the future, 
certain changes will take place in the conversion terms.* 
Regardless of the type of contract, however, the invariable 
effect of the specified changes is a decrease in the amount 
of common stock obtainable by conversion; or, to say the 
same thing in a different way, the invariable effect is 
to increase the price of the common stock to~ the preferred. 
1c. J. Pilcher, .2E.• cit., p~ 30. 
*Another type of contract specifies that the conver-
sion price will change after a certain number of preferred 
shares have been converted~ This type is rarely encount-
ered, however, in the case of convertible preferred stock~ 
Neither of the two studies above encountered a single 
example~ 
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TABLE VII 
97 Convertible Preferred Stocks Outstanding in 1962; 
Constant Conversion Terms vs. Changing Conversion Terms 
Total Number 
of Issues 
97 
Number with Percentage having 
Constant Conversion Constant Conversion 
Terms Terms 
75 77 
Source: Spencer, Trask & crompany 
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TABLE VIII 
Conversion Price; Re1ative Use of Different Types, 
Type Conversion 
Price 
Constant 
Changing 
1948-1952 
Seventy-three 
Preferred Stocks 
Source:, Derived from tab1e in Raising Capita1 with 
Convertib1e Securities by c. J. Pilcher. 
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shareholder.* An example of a convertible preferred hav-
ing changing conversion terms is Kaiser Aluminum 4 3/4% 
(1959 issue). It is convertible into common at $50 per 
share of common through May 31, 1967 and at $55 thereafter. 
Duration of the Conversion Option 
Among both types of convertible preferreds discussed 
above -- those with constant conversion terms and those 
with changing conversion terms -- some have conversion 
options that expire as of a certain date** while others 
have conversion options of unlimited duration. 
An example of a convertible preferred having constant 
conversion terms but a limited conversion option is Bene-
ficial Finance $4.50. It is convertible into common at 
the rate of two shares of common stoak for each share of 
the preferred until November, 1966, at which time the con-
version option expires.*** 
*A major purpose of this "step-up" is thought to be 
the stimulation of conversion. If at any particular time 
conversion was profitable to the preferred shareholder 
(market price of the stock higher than the conversion 
price), delay of conversion beyond the time of change in 
conversion terms (increase in conversion price) would. de-
crease that profit. (C.J~Pilcher, ~· cit., p. 32). 
**An opposite situation encountered quite rarely is 
that of delayed convertibility where the conversion option 
can not be exercised prior to a certain date. An example 
of such an issue is OWens-Illinois Glass 4% Convertible 
Preferred, issued in 1956 but. not convertible until 1958; 
***The Standard Oil of California $3.30 referred to above 
is an example of a convertible having constant conve~ion 
terms for an unlimited period (see section on constant vs. 
changing conversion terms). 
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An examp~e of a convertible preferred having changing 
conversion terms and a limited conversion option is Newmont 
Mining 4%. It is convertib~e into 1.111 common shares 
through April 30, 1967; it is then convertible into 1 com-
mon share through April 30, 1977 at which time the conver-
sion option expires.* 
As to whether the limited or unlimited conversion 
option is more common, there seems to be some difference 
of opinion. 
Pilcher's study of 73 convertible preferred stocks 
issued ·durih·g 1948-1952** indicated that 47 or 67% had con-
version options of limited duration. 8 On the other hand, 
A. s. Dewing, writing in 1953, states, "with convertible 
stocks, fixed time limits are unusual."9 
A study of 97 convertible preferreds listed in a 1962 
publication of Spencer, Trask & Co~***indicated that 31% 
*The Kaiser Aluminum 4 3/4% (1959) mentioned above is. 
an example of a convertib~e having changing conversion terms 
but an unlimited conversion option (see section on constant 
vs. changing conversion terms). 
**See previous section for initial reference to this 
stud~~ _ 
Ibi~, pp. 48-49. 
9newing, A.s., .2£• ill·, p. 264. 
***See section above on "changing vs. constant conversion 
terms" for initial reference to this study. 
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of these issues had conversion options of limited duration. 
(See Table IX.) Another study of 102 convertible preferreds 
listed in a 1962 publication of R.H.M. Associates10 indi-
cated that only 27% had limited conversion options. (See 
Table X). 
At first blush it would seem that less convertibles 
had conversion options of limited dUration in 1962 than ~ 
the 1948-1952 period. However, the two 1962 studies are not 
directly comparable with the earlier, Pilcher study, for 
the 1962 studies involve lists of outstanding issues whereas 
the Pilcher study involves new issues. It might well be 
that convertibles with limited-duration conversion options 
have a shorter life-span than other convertibles; and if 
they do, it would be likely that a list of outstanding sec-
urities would contain a lower proportion of such convertibles 
than a list of new issues. 
Anti-dilution clauses 
Should the value of a given company's common stock be 
reduced by dilution of any sort, the "conversion value" of 
the convertible preferred would simultaneously be reduced 
unless a change were made in the conversion terms. To 
10The R.H.M. Convertible Survey. New York, R.H.M. 
Associates, November 16, 1962. 
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TABLE IX 
97 Oonvertible Preferred Stocks Outstanding in 1962;: 
Conversion Options of Limited Duration 
Relative to Total 
Total Convertible 
Preferred Stocks 
97 
Number having 
Conversion Option 
of Limited Duration 
30 
Source: Spencer, Trask & Oo. 
Per cent having 
Conversion Option 
of Limited 
Duration 
31 
24 
TABU. X 
102 Convertibi.e Preferred Stocks Outstanding on 
November 16, 1962 ;· Conversion Option 
of Limited Duration Relative to Total 
Numb$r having Percent having 
25 
Total Convertible 
Preferred Stocks Conversion Option Conversion Option 
of Limited Duration of limited Duration 
102 28.. 31 
Source:, R.H.M. Associates 
i11ustrate, 1et us take a company whose convertib1e pre-
ferred (par = $100) is convertib1e into common at the rate 
of two shares of common for every share of preferred. The 
common se11s at $30. The "conversion va1ue" of the pre-
ferred, therefore, is· $60. If the company then splits its 
stock 2 for 1, this "di1ution" might cause the stock's 
price to fa1l as 1ow as $15. But since the conversion terms: 
have remained unchange·d, the preferred shareho1der can sti11 
on1y obtain two shares of common for each share of preferred, 
and, according1y, conversion va1ue is now much 1ess and may 
be as 1ow as $30 (if the stock price fa11s to $15). 
To protect the convertib1e preferred shareho1der 
against such a reduction in conversion value due to dilu-
tion, most convertib1e securitieSJ contain "anti-dilution" 
c1auses. Such provisions "endeavor to reduce the conversion 
price proportionately to any decrease in the per share va1ue 
arising through any act of dilution. n11 
Ca11abi1ity 
Most convertibl.e preferreds are cal.lao1e by the com-
pany at prices specified in the preferred contract. A study 
o~ a11 convertible preferred stocks listed on the New York 
11Gra.ham, B·.f, Dodd, D; L~, and Cottle, S:. Security 
Ana1ysis~ New York, McGraw Hi11, Fourth Edition, 1962, 
p~ 615 •. 
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and American Stock Exchange~ as of April 16, 1962 indicate~ 
that only 1~ were not callable~ (See Table XI.) 
The "call" price is often set at a slight premium 
over par value. But in the case of convertible instruments 
this is not always much of a protection to the shareholder·, 
since, due to the presence of the conversion privilege, 
convertible securities often have a market value consider-
ably higher than par value. An example illustrates this 
problem: Beatrice Foods 3 3/81' c·onvertible Preference solei 
at a 1962 high of $328 before it was called in August at 
$104.50~ 
However, this is not as serious as it seems, for con-
version is still possible after the announcement of redemp-
tion, and sufficient notice is usually given to allow the 
preferred shareholder ample time to effect conversion~ 
Pilcher makes the following comments about the possibility 
of conversion when a stock bas been called:: 
As to the length of notice required upon 
announcement of redemption, it is common practice 
to provide 30 days. This is long enough to per-
mit the senior security holders to receive notice 
of the call. Since conversion is permitted up 
to five or ten days prior to redemption date, 
adequate time exists for conversion •••• l2 
12P"l h "t . 54· J. c er, .2.£. .£!.._. , p. • 
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TABLE. XI 
Convertible Preferred Stocks Listed on the New York or 
American Exchange; Number Callable Relative to Total, 
April. 16, 1962 
Total Number of 
Convertible 
Issues 
442 
Number 
Calla.ble 
Source:; Financial World Magazine. 
Per Cent 
callable 
go; 
28 
29 
CHAPTER III - QUALITY 
Introduction 
In market jargon, the convertible feature of a pre-
ferred stock is often referred to as a "sweetener." At least 
one implication of this term is that the convertible feature 
is used as a marketing device, particularly in the case of 
poorer quality issues that might not sell too well if sold 
as "straight" preferreds. 
A later chapter will delve more deeply into the var-
ious corporate motives lying behind the issue of convertible 
preferreds. It will be indicated at that time that to some 
extent the inclusion of the conversion option in preferred 
stock contracts is for the purpose of increasing the pre-
ferred's marketability. On the other hand, it will also be 
argued that this is by no means the only explanation of the 
presence of the conversion option, and that there are other 
basic purposes that have nothing to do with the marketabil-
ity of the preferred. 
However, apart from the actual reason or reasons for 
inclusion of the conversion option, the use of the epithet, 
"Sweetener" does raise the question, "are convertible pre-
ferreds apt to be of lower quality on the average than non-
convertible preferreds?" The general consensus of market 
opinion seems to be that they are;. the use of the term 
"sweetener" is but one expression of this opinion. 
The task of this chapter will be to determine what 
validity there is to this general market opinion. The chap-
ter will conclude that convertible preferreds are, on the 
average, lower quality securities than the average non-con-
vertible preferred. However, two caveats are perhaps in 
order at the outset. The first is that the lower average 
quality does not mean that high quality convertible pre-
ferreds do not exist -- they do. The second is that the 
fact of lower average quality is not in itself proof that 
the principal reason for the presence of the conversion op-
tion is that of providing an off-set to this lower quality. 
That is, confirmation of the general market opinion that 
convertibles are of lower average quality does not neces-
sarily confirm the market opinion that the motive behind 
inclusion of the conversion privilege is that of increased 
marketability. The existence of a correlation between con-
vertibility and lower average quality does indicate the 
likelihood. that such a motive plays a part. But, again, it 
will be iniicated in a later chapter that there are advan-
tages to raising capital with convertible securities that 
have nothing to do with marketability. 
Quality as measured by market behavior - I 
Graham and Dodd made a study of all preferred stocks 
30-
issued in 1946. In this study they compared the market be-
havior of the non-convertible preferreds with the convertible 
by comparing the price changes of the two groups between 
31 
the time of issue and subsequent lows through July, 1947; 
Their findings are reproduced in Table XII. Their conclusion, 
based upon these findings, is that "the greater weakness of 
the privileged issues in the 1946-1947 period was without 
question a reflection of their poorer investment quality."l3 
Comment will be made on this conclusion in the course of 
the following section. 
quality as measured by market·behavior- II 
A thesis anti tled Preferred Stocks_ .bY Samuel H. Ba.llamf4 
contains data which permits interesting comparison with the 
Graham and Dodd findings. 
One study made by Ballam involved all issues of call-
able industrial preferred stock and all issues of conver-
tible preferred stock over $5,.000,000 in size issued in 
1946 •15* This study compared the price declines of tha· · 
13 . . -
"Graham, B. , Dodd., D .L. , and Cottle , S , ..2.£. cit • , 
p. 603. -
14-Ba.llam, S.H: Preferred. Stocks. New Brunswick (N.J.), 
Rutgers University, 1955. 
15tbid., ch. IVt •. 
*Ballam compiled this list from advertisements in 
The New York Times during 1946~ 
TABLE XII 
Price Record of New Preferred Stock Issues 
Price change from 
issue price to 
1ow up to 
July 1947 
No d.ec1ine 
Dec1ined: 
0- 9.99 per cent 
10 -1~99 per cent 
20-39.99 per cent 
40-percent or more 
Totals 
Average dec1ine 
Offered in 1946 
"Straight" 
issues 
7 issues 
16 
11 
l 
0 
37 
About ~ 
Convertible 
and Partici-
pating issues 
0 issues 
2 
6 
22 
12 
42 
About 30% 
Source: Reproduction of table in Securitl Analysis, 
4th Edition, by Graham, Dodd and Cottle, p. 603. 
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various .. stocks from their issue price in 1946 to their 1946-
1954 lows.1t. Thus this study is much like Graham and D.odd' s 
except for the fact that it oovers. a longer perio&and 
although its primary purpose was not to determine the qual-
ity of convertible preferreds relative to preferreds- aa a 
whole. Ba.llam' s findings that a:re relevant for our pur-
poses here are tabulated in Table XIII~ As in the case of 
the Graham and. Dodd study, the convertibles showed greater 
price weakness than did the non-convertibles. 
Graham and Dodd, on the basis of their findings, con-
cluded that this greater price weakness on the part of the 
convertibles reflected "poorer investment quality." It is 
believed that this is a generally valid. conclusion. Never-
theless, it is possible that the difference in price behavior 
in both the Graham and Dodd and Ballam studies may over-
state the degree of quality difference between convertibles 
as a group and non-convertibles as a group. 
As is true with any investment, timing can play a very 
important part in eventual success. At certain times cer-
tain investments can be relatively overpriced. In the above 
two studies, both groups of preferreds -- the convertibles 
*Many of the lows, Ballam points outr were reached in 
June, 1953, the period of highest interest rates during the 
periocL 
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TABLE XIII 
Market Action of 43 Industrial Preferred Stocks 
Issued in 1946; Price Decline to 1946-1954 Low 
(All Callable Industrial Preferred Stock 
Issues and all Convertible Industrial 
Preferred Stock Issues of $5,000,000 or 
more advertised in The New York Times: 
% Decline from 
Offering Price 
to 1946-1954 
Low Price 
Less than 1~ 
10 - 19 
20 - 29 
30 % or more 
During 1946) 
Callable Industrial 
Preferreds 
(Per Cent) 
7.~ 
28-.6 
21.4 
4.2.9 
100.0 
Source: Ballam, s-. H~, Preferred Stocks 
Convertible Indus-
trial Preferreds 
(Per Cent) 
0 
13.3 
13.3 
73.4 
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and the non-convertibles ~ were issued in the same year, 
1946. However, it is still possible and in fact probable 
that the convertibles were, as a group, more over-priced 
than the non-convertibles. The basis for this possibilit~ 
lies in the market situation in 1946 prior to the end of 
August, and the especially high appeal that convertibles 
have been observed to have in similar periods. Roger F. 
Murray, Vice President of Bankers. Trust Company, New York• 
states the case as follows: 
The comparatively poor experience of inves-
tors with convertible preferreds is primarily 
attributable to faulty selection, as in the 
case of other types of securities; but an im-
. portant factor is bad timing. It just happens 
that companies are most eager to offer, and 
investors most eager to buy, convertible is-
sues at the time when they are least likely 
to prove desirable holdings. 
An example of bad timing and its consequences 
can be found in the first eight months of 1946, 
the portion of the year which preceded the 
stock market break of early September. Stock 
prices were buoyant, public interest in the 
market was increasing, and, with interest 
rates extremely low, preferred stocks were 
selling at record high prices. To companies 
in need of permanent capital, this was an ex-
cellent·7.;tim.e to do preferred stock financing. 
Many investors, on the other hand, were look-
ing back over four years of rising common stock 
prices and beginning to wonder whether the up-
ward surge would last forever. In this mood, 
they thought, as .investors always do near the 
peak of a major bull market, that convertibles 
would protect them ag.ainst a market decline, 
yet provide participation in a further market 
rise if one should materialize.1o 
1~.F .. Murray: "Convertible Preferred Stocks" Trusts 
and Estates, June, 1953, p. 428. 
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The fact that interest rates were extremely low (prices 
high) in the first months of 1947 and steadily increased 
through 1953 would, of course, be an explanation for some 
of the decline in prices tn both convertible and non-con-
vertible preferreds during the period.. However, to some 
extent the greater decline in the convertibles may have 
been due to relatively greater buoyancy in the convertible 
market at the beginning of the period than in the preferred 
market as a whole at that time. 
In conclusion, then, to this and the preceding section, 
it is believed that the results of the two studies of price 
behavior do indicate poorer quality on the part of the 
convertibles. On the other hand, possible over-pricing 
of convertibles relative to non-convertibles during 1946, 
the first year of the period studied in each study, may ex-
plain some of the greater price weakness of the convertibles 
in the following years. And, to the extent that this is 
the case, the degree of difference in price behavior may 
overstate the degree of difference in quality~ 
Quality as measured by statistical standards - II 
Perhaps a more direct route to the establishment of 
the quality of convertible preferreds is to be found. in tha 
application of various statistical standards~ 
:Ballam. made a study of 200 preferred stocks outstand-
ing as of December 31, 1954.17 Included in this list were 
125 "straight" industrial preferreds and 23 convertible 
industrial preferreds. On the basis of a comparison be-
tween the market behavior of these stocks in the 1946-1954 
period and their quality as determined by statistical stan-
dards, he developed the following minimum statistical 
standards for selection of investment quality industrial 
preferred stocks:. 
1. OVerall dividend coverage after taxea. should 
amount to an average over recent years of at least 6 times. 
The overall coverage in any one year should not be less 
than four times. 
2~ Market equity as a percentage of total cap-
italization should be at least 70%. 
Ballam made a tabulation of the number of stocks that 
met or exceeded these standards. On the basis of Ballam's 
data it is possible to make a comparison between the qual-
ity of the non-convertible industrial preferreds and the 
convertible industrial preferreds by comparing the per-
centage of stocks in the former group that met or exceeded 
the above standards with the corresponding percentage of 
17Ballam, s.H: . ~· cit •. , ch. v:. 
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stocks in the later group. This comparison is made in 
Table XIV. Fifty-five per cent of the non-convertible in-
dustrials met Ballam•s standards whereas on1y 30% of the 
convertible industrials did. Thus we have further indica-
tion that convertible preferred stoCks are apt to be of 
lower quality on the average than their non-convertible 
counterparts. 
Quality as measured by statistical standards - II 
Quality comparison between non-convertible and con-
vertible preferreds on the basis of more recent data is 
afforded by a study of a11 preferred stocks listed on the 
New York and American StoCk Exchanges as of April 16,1962. 
The source for this list of stocks was Financial World 
Magazine.* This list comprised 442 preferred stocks, 86 
of which were convertibles. The basis for quality compari-
son were the quality ratings given to the various preferred 
stocks by Financial World., This magazine gives the fol-
lowing ratings to preferred stocks: A+, A, B+, B, C+ and c. 
The results of this study are tabulated in Table XV~ 
Two columns of this table list the number and percentage 
of al1 the preferred stocks according to rating classifi-
cation. Two other columns list the number and percentage 
of the convertibles according to rating classification. 
* See footnote 4, page 14, for initial reference. 
3& 
125 Industrial Non-convertible Preferred Stocks and 
23 Industrial Convertible Preferred Stocks Outstanding 
December 31, 1954; Per eent Meeting or Exceeding 
Minimum Quality Standards.* 
Type of Preferred 
123 Industrial 
Non-convertible 
Preferreds 
23 Industrial 
Convertible 
Preferreds 
Number Meeting or 
Exceeding Minimum 
Standards 
68 
7 
Source:: Ballam, Preferred Stocks 
Per Cent Meeting 
or Exceeding 
Minimum Standard& 
55 
30 
*These are:~ (1) Average overall dividend coverage of six 
times or more (1946-1954); Overall dividend 
coverage not less than four times in any 
one year (1946-1954). 
(2) %Market equity in total capitalization 
not less than 7Qtfo ( 1954) • · 
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TABLE XV 
Preferred Stocks Listed on the New York or American 
Stock Exchange, April 16 ~ 1962 r Quality of 
Convertible Preferred Stocks Relative to Total 
Preferred Stocks on the Basis of Financial World 
Magazine Quality Ra tinge 
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Number of Per Cent Total Number of Per Cent of 
Rating Preferreds Preferreds Convertible Total Con-
Preferreds vertible 
Preferreds 
A+ 60 13.6 6 7.0 
A 108 24.,6 9 10.5 
B+ 139 31.4 19 22.1 
B 89 20.2 33 38.4 
C+ 29 6 .. 6 14 16.2 
c 8 1.8 1 1.2 
No rating 
given 9 2 .. 0 4 4.6 
Source: Financial World Magazine 
Table XV indicates that the quality o£ the preferreds 
as a whole was higher on the average than the quality of 
the convertibles on the average. Thirty-eight and tw.o 
tenths per cent of all the prefe;rreds had a rating of "A" 
of higher, while only 17.5% of the convertibles had such 
ratings~ Only 18.4% of the total number of preferred 
stocks had a rating of "C+" or "C", while 17.4% of the 
convertibles had such ratings. 
Quality as measured by statistical standards - III 
The preceding sections of this chapter have all indi-
cated that convertible preferreds on the average are lower 
quality securities than non-convertible preferreds. How~ 
ever~ as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, 
the fact that average quality is lower does not mean that 
high quality convertible preferreds do not exist. Just 
as there is considerable quality variation among non-con-
vertibles, so is such variation to be found among conver-
tibles. This, of course, is not to say that the determin-
ation of the quality of convertibles as a group relative 
to the quality of non-convertibles as a group is not a 
meaningful comparison to make. But there is one quite 
important way in which the lower average quality of con-
vertibles as determined above is not too meaningful. And 
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this has to do with methods of selection of securities for 
investment. 
An investor (as opposed to a specuJ.ato:r} looking 
for securities possessing investment quality need not be 
so concerned about the average quality of any given class 
of security as he should be concerned about the quality 
of particular securities. If securities were purchased 
at random within a given class of security, then an in-
vestor would be well-advised to stiCk to the types of 
security possessing the highest average quality. But a 
selective investor is interested in the quality of partic-
ular securities, not the average quality of the class of 
security to which the particular securities happen to belong. 
On this basis, then, it seems relevant to conclude 
this chapter with a consideration of the quality range 
among convertible preferreds.o That is, among convertible 
preferreds as a class what opportunities exist for satis-
factory investment from the point of view of quality.* 
A study was made of all industrial and all utility 
convertible preferred stocks of u.s. corporations out-
standing as of May, 1962. (Class A stock was excluded.) 
* Of course, as is the case with other types of se-~· 
curities, quality is only one of several variables to be 
considered in reaching a sound investment decision. 
The number of stocks amounted to 207 industrials and 6~ 
utilities. The sources for this study were Moody's Indus-
trial Manuall~ana. Moody's Public Utility Manuals •19 
The overall dividend coverage of each of these stocks 
was computed for each year 1955-1961, or from year of is-
sue through 1961 in the case of securities issued after 
1955; a few convertibles were issued in early 1962 and 
in these oases 1961 data was used with adjustment to in-
clude dividend payments on the new preferred~ 
The overall dividend coverage was computed on a 
before tax basis as suggested by Graham, Dodd and Cottle 
in Security Analysis, 4th Edition. 2Q The tax rate for all 
companies was assumed to be 50%. Thus, to compute cover-
age on a before tax basis, the amount of preferred divi-
dends had to be doubled. 
These computations having been completed, a tabula-
tion was made to determine the number of issues that sat-
isfied minimum coverage standards for investment quality 
preferreds. The standard used was again based on recom-
mendations presented in Security Analysis. 21 This text 
18:porter, J .s., ed:: Mood~s Manual •.•• Industrial 
Securities~ New .York, Moody's ~vestor Service. 
19 Seour-
ities. 
~· ~·' ch. 28. 
p. 384. 
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recommends the following minimum coverages for preferred 
stocks:-* 
A. Average overall coverage for a period of from. 
seven to ten years should equal. at least 7 times fixed 
charges (including, of course, preferred dividends) for 
industrials and 4 times for utilities; 
.2!: B. The earnings of the poorest year during the 
period should equal at J.ea.st 5 times fixed charges for in-
dustrials and 3 times for utilities. 22 
In tabulating the number of the industrial and util-
ity convertible preferreds which satisfied minimum coverage 
requirements for investment quality preferreds, standard 
"B" was used.** 
The results of this tabulation are summarized in 
Table XVI. Thirteen or 21% of the 61 utilities and thirty-
four or 16% of the 207 industrials had earnings coverages 
on an overall basis that met standard "B". 
*As a. matter of fact, the authors feel that a. pre-
ferred stock should meet the same standards as bonds. Thus 
the minimum dividend coverages listed above are the same as 
those for bonds. 
22 8 Ibid., p. 34 • 
** As mentioned earlier, the period used in calculat-
ing the earnings coverage of the various stocks was the 
seven-year period 1955-196l.. However, a number of the stocks 
were issued during that period; indeed, a. few were issued 
in 1962. Consequently, for these stocks the "poorest year 
during the period" was necessarily selected from a period 
shorter than 7 years, and for those stocks issued in 1961 
and 1962 the "poorest year" was the same as the "best 
year." 
Quality as measured by statistical standards - IV 
An interesting comparison can be made between the 
results of the study discussed in the previous section and 
the tabulation made of preferred stocks on the basis of 
ratings given them by Financial World Magazine. (See Tables 
XV and XVI.) The latter tabulation, it will be remembered, 
involved all preferred stocks including convertibles listed 
on the New York and American Stock Exchanges as of April 
16, 1962, and thus, in contrast to the study reported in 
the previous section, involves pretty exclusively the 
stocks of larger companies. It is interesting to note 
that the percentage of convertible preferreds which are 
given an "A+u or "A" rating is 17.5%, exactly the s~me 
percentage that met the quality standard applied to all 
. 
industrial and utility convertible preferreds listed in 
Moody's as of May, 1962. Largely a coincidence it would 
seem, but an interesting one nevertheless. 
The proportion of high quality convertibles as de-
termined by the dividend coverage analysis of the conver-
tibles listed in Moody's and by the Financial World 
quality ratings of convertibles listed on the New York 
and American Stock Exchanges is probably understated. 
The reason for this is the fact that high quality issues 
are apt to fare better in the market and thus offer 
45 
TABLE XVI 
207 Industrial and 61 Public Utility Convertible 
Preferred Stocks Outstanding in May, 1962 ;· 
Per Cent Meeting a Certain Dividend. Coverage 
Standard* 
Type of Issue Total Number Number 
Meeting 
Standard 
Per Cent 
Meeting 
Standard 
Industrials 207 34 16 
Publia: 
Utilities 61 13 21 
-
Total 268 47 17.5 
Source: Moody's Manuals 
* The Standard was: overall dividend coverage not less 
than 5 times for industrials and not 
less than 3 times for public util-
ities in any year the preferred was 
outstanding during the period 1955-
1961. 
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opportunity for profitable oonversion more often and more 
rapidly after issue than the lower quality issues. And 
with higher turnover via conversion among the higher 
quality issues, a list of convertibles outstanding as 
of any point in time would contain relatively more lower 
quality issues than a list of new issues. Pilcher puts 
it this way: 
Any list of outstanding convertibles 
chosen at random would be heavily weighted 
with mediocre to poor quality securities. 
The conversion option, to be exercised, typ-
ical.ly depends upon a rise in earnings and 
hence price of the co~on shares. In pros-
perous companies this wil.l. occur and conversion 
will take place. On the other hand no con-
version will be made in those companies whose 
earnings and price of the common decline. Such 
a corporation's convertible securities will 
remain outstanding. during the entire life of 
the special option. Thus, at any one timet 
all the unsuccessful convertibles offered dur-
ing the past 10 or 1.5 years will be outstSj_nding, 
while man~ of the convertible issues of expand-
ing companies wil.l have been surrendered for 
conversion.23 
Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has approached the question of the in-
vestment quality of convertible preferred stocks from two 
points of reference: 1) the average quality of the con-
vertibles as a class relative to the average quality of 
23Pilcher, ~· cit., P• 
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preferred stocks as a whole; 2) the quality range among 
convertible preferred stocks. 
With respect to (1), two methods of evaulation were 
used~ A) quality differences as revealed by price be-
havior, and- B) quality differences as revealed by the 
application of statistical standards. Both methods pro-
vided findings which quite conclusively demonstrated that 
on the average the quality of convertible preferreds is 
lower than that of preferred stocks as a whole. In con-
nection with these findings a general comment was made to 
the effect that the lower average quality of convertibles 
is not too meaningful to an investor in at least one way; 
For, an investor buys stocks selectively -- not at random 
-- and~ this being the case, an investor is more interested 
in the existence of higher quality securities within a par-
ticular class than he is in the average quality of any 
particul.a.r class relative to that of another;. 
With respect to (2), the quality range among conver-
tibles, a study of 268 industrial and public utility con-
vertible preferreds indicated that around 1 out of 6 
equaled a more or less stringent standard of earnings 
coverage. An identical proportion of all convertible pre-
ferred stocks listed on the New York or American Stock 
Exchange were given a rating of "A+" or "A" by Financial 
World Magazine. This proportion is belieYed to be 
sufficiently high to warrant investor interest in this 
type of security. 
The above ratio of l to 6 should be considered a 
minimum since the list of stocks studied was undoubtedly 
weighted in favor of the lower quality issues due to the 
higher turnover rate of the high quality issues. 
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CHAPTER IV - MARKET BEHA. VIOR 
Introduction 
Convertible preferred stocks exhibit all the patterns: 
of market behavior exhibited by non-convertible preferreds, 
and are subject to all the forces that determine these 
various patterns. However, the presence of the conversion 
option in the convertibles represents an additional var-
iable which causes the market behavior of the "converts" 
to deviate from that of their "straight" counterparts in 
various ways. 
The market behavior of preferred stocks as one type 
of fixed-income security can perhaps be said to be a func-
tion of the quality of a given stock in relationship to 
prevailing interest rates and to prevailing economic con-
ditions. As a general rule, the market behavior of issues 
of such high quality that dividend payment is virtually 
assured is a function pretty exclusively of interest rate 
changes and is relatively unaffected by prevailing business 
conditions. Such preferreds are often called "money pre-
ferreds." On the other hand, issues of lower quality are 
affected by both interest rate changes and business cycle 
changes, and the lower the quality the greater the influ-
ence of the latter. For, the lower the quality, the 
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stronger is the relationship between fluctuations in 
earnings and ability to pay dividends. John c. Clendenin 
states the case as follows in Introduction to Investment~ 
The best preferred stocks are as secure 
and almost as certain of ~egular payment as 
high-grade bonds~ They do not fluctuate seri-
ousl.y in price because of business conditions. 
However, the substantial changes in interest 
rates which have ocourre.d since 1950 have pro-
duced major price changes in the best grade 
preferreds~ Medium-grade preferreds are affected 
both by company earnings and by yield ra tea; 
in the winter of 1958-1959, for example, many 
such preferreds looked safer because of improv-
ing company earnings but rose little in price 
because rising bond yiel.ds attracted the buyers 
away from preferreds~ The yields on low-grade 
preferreds are competitive with common stocks 
rather than bonds, and the p~ices of such pre-
ferreds are quite volatil.e.24 
The market behavior of convertible preferreds, like 
preferreds in general, is a function of quality in rela-
tionship to prevailing interest rates and business condi-
tions. But their market behavior is also a function of: 
the relationship between the conversion price of the 
common stocks into which they are convertible and the 
market price of these stocks. 
An individual convertible at a given point in time 
will practically invariably have a market price that ia 
higher than a non-convertible having exactly the same qual-
ity. If, for example, a given company has two issues of 
preferred stock outstanding both of which have the same 
24olendenin, J. 0:: Introduction to Investments, 
New York, McGraw Hill, Third Edition, 196o, p. 135. 
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dividend rate and both of which are equally secured, if 
one of the issues is a convertible it would (practically 
invariably) sell at a higher price than the non-convert-
ible. This extra price paid for the convertible is usually 
referred to as "premium over investment value," "invest-
ment value" in this sense being that price at which the 
c_onverti ble would sell if it were not convertible~ Deter-
mination of the investment value of a convertible is easy 
in such a case as the above hypothetical example. In this 
example, since the two preferred stocks are of identical 
quality (they are both issues of the same company and are 
equally secured) the market price of the non-convertible 
is presumably the price the convertible would sell at were 
it not convertible; thus, the "investment value" of the 
convertible is indicated by the market price* of the non-
convertible. When such a comparison with another issue 
of the same company is not possible, estimation of invest-
ment value must be made on the basis of comparison with 
non-convertible issues of other companies judged to be of 
similar quality~ 
The magnitude of this premium over investment value 
and the market behavior of a convertible over time will 
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* In this case the dividend ratea of the two preferreds 
are the same. If the dividend rate of the convertible were 
different the market price of the non-convertible would 
have to be adjusted to reflect this difference before it 
would_ truly indicate the "investment value" of the con-
vertible~ 
be influenced by the relationship between the conversion 
price of the common stock and the market price of the 
common stock into which the preferred is convertible. 
The following sections of this chapter will examine the 
effect different relationships of this sort on premium 
over investment value and market behavior. Of fundamental 
concern will be an attempt to isolate and catalogue the 
various ways in which the presence of the conversion priv-
ilege causes the price of a convertible at any given 
point in time and the market behavior of a convertible. 
over time to differ from that of a non-convertible. 
C;Onvertibl.e preferreds selling "on conversion" 
A convertible preferred stock is selling "on conver-
sion" when the market price of the related common stock 
is equal to or higher than the conversion price~* When 
such is the case, the market price of the preferred will 
be approximately the same as its "conversion value."** 
As for isolating the effects of the conversion privilege' 
* For preferreds whose conversion terms are stated 
in the form of a ratio, the equivalent of the conversion 
price can be obtained by ~ividing the par or stated value 
of the stock by the ratio~ For no-par stocks, translation 
of a conversion ratio into a conversion price involves 
estimation of an approximate face value~ 
** "Conversion value" = number of shares of common 
a~ock obtainable·by conversion. X current market price of 
the common stock; 
convertibles that are selling "on conversionn offer the 
leas-t difficulty. For, when such is the case the basic 
determinant of their market behavior is the market price 
of the related common stock~ In such a situation, qual-
ity, prevailing interest rates and business conditions 
have no bearing. Price movements of convertibles selling 
"on conversion" are almost perfectly correlated with price 
movements of the related common. And, as above, price at 
any given moment will almost exactly equal their conver-
sion value~ 
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An example illustrating the above is Pacific Light-
ing (No Par) $4.75 Convertible Preferred. It is convertible 
into 2.6 shares of Pacific Lighting Common. On November 
14, 1962, the common stock closed at a price of 55 5/8. 
This gave a conversion value of 144 1/2 to the convert-
ible preferred (2.6 X 55 5/8 • 144 1/2). On this same 
date the closing price of the convertible was 144 1/4~ 
Over a month later, on December 28, 1962, the common had 
risen to 60 5/8. Accordingly, the conversion value of 
the preferred at this date had become 157 1/2 (2.6 x 60 5/8 
= 157 1/2). On this date the closing price of the conver-
tible was 158~ 
As the above example of a convertible selling on con-
version illustrates, the price of the preferred is pract-
ically identical with conversion value under such 
circumstances~ And changes in the conversion value 
due to changes in the market price of the common - lead 
to practically identical changes in the price of the 
preferred. 
The above example illustrates, also, another aspect 
of the market behavior of convertible preferreds selling 
on conversion. Namely, the fact that corresponding price 
changes of the common and preferred stocks are propor-
tionate by a ratio equal to the conversion ratio~ If 
this ratio is greater than 11 a given price change in the 
common will lead to a greater price change in the pre-
ferred. This was the case in the above example where the 
conversion ratio was 2.6, and it can be observed that the 
price change in the common led to a price change in the 
preferred 2.6 times as great. The price of the common 
rose 5 points from 55 5/8 to 60 5/8, while the preferred 
rose approximately 13 points from 144 1/4 to 157 1/2 --
and 13/5 = 2.6. Of course, if the common had declined in 
price the preferred would also have declined and by a 
greater amount. 
Thus, convertible preferreds selling on conversion 
exhibit a market behavior that is like that of common 
stocks, not preferred stocks; and, depending upon the con-
version ratio, their behavior may be even more volatile 
than common stocks. A given increase in price points on 
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the part of the common will lead to price point gain on 
the part of the preferred -- and this gain may be a mul-
tiple of the increase in the common. And the same process, 
takes place on the rt downside tr • 
However, on the "downside" there presumably is a 
"floor" below which the price of the preferred will not 
fall. This floor has to do with the "investment value" 
of the preferred. At some point, that is, the price of.' 
the preferred will be low enough and the yield high enough 
to make the stock attractive on the basis of its qualifi-
cations as a fixed-income security. This price or invest-
ment value would be dependent upon yields available from 
straight preferreds of similar quality (and these yields, 
in turn, would be dependent upon prevailing'.interest 
rates~ business conditions, etc.). 
Consequently, the higher the conversion value -- and 
thus the price of the preferred -- rises above this invest-
ment value floor, the greater is the equivalence between 
the market behavior of the preferred and the market be-
havior of common stocks. For example, Safeway Stores 
4.30% Convertible Preferred sold at a 1961 high of 404!~ 
Since the conversion ratio for this preferred is 6i shares 
of common for each share o:f preferred' the common must 
have been selling at about 62 (404i/6i) when this high 
was reached. Assuming that the investment value of this 
preferred at that t~e was 100 (in terms of yields on 
straight preferreds of identical quality) the price of 
the preferred could have fallen 304~ points before it 
reached this floor. Since the conversion ratio is 6!, 
this would have involved a 47 point or 76% decline in the 
price of the common (304/6i = 47-- 47/62 = .76). Thus~ 
the market behavior of this stock, selling at a price so 
far above its investment value, certainly is equivalent 
to the market behavior of a common stock on the downside 
as well as the upside despite the floor that is provided 
by "investment value" in the case of downward movements. 
In recognition of the common stock attributes of the 
market behavior of convertibles selling much above their 
investment value, one investment counsel firm considers 
any convertible with a price 30% or more above investment 
value as belonging to the common stock portion of a port-
folio rather than the senior securities section. :_;And, 
correspondingly, analysis of these securities becomes the 
province of the common stock department rather than the 
senior securities department~ And rightly so, it would 
seem; for future price movements nave much more to do with 
the outlook for common stocks than anything to do with 
the outlook in the senior securities market. 
One further note should be made about convertible 
pref'erreds selling "on conversion." And that is that, of' 
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course, yields on these stocks are low due to their high 
prices~ The yield, for example, of the Safeway Stores 
4.30% would have only been 1.06% at its price of 404!~ 
This perhaps is an extreme case. But, in any event, yields 
of preferreds selling on conversion are never as high as 
they would be if they were selling at the price floor 
represented by their investment value. 
Convertible preferred sell~ above conversion value 
Normally, when a convertible preferred stock is is-
sued, the conversion price of the related common stock is 
above the current market price of the common stock; That 
isl, to say the same thing in a different way, the conver-
sion value of the preferred at time of issue would normal-
ly be below the issue price of the preferred. The margin 
by which the conversion price exceeds the current market 
price of the common stock tends to varyl depending upon 
circumstances of issue, among other things. But prac-
tically invariably some margin exists with the consequence 
that profitable conversion must await future advances in 
the price of the common~ For example, Minneapolis H0ney-
well Regulator 3% Convertible Preferred was issued in 
April 1961 at a prioe of 1001 and it is convertible into 
common at a conversion price of $180. However, the 1961 
high of the common stock was only 170 3/4~ 
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Subsequent to time of issue the price of the related. 
common stock hopefully will rise sufficiently to cause 
the conversion value of the preferred to exceed issue 
price or face value. Even if this occurs, however, 
future declines in the common can cause conversion value 
to sink back down below the preferred's face value. 
Of interest in this section is the market behavior 
of convertibles. during periods when the conversion value 
is below the price of the preferred. And particularly 
of interest is the extent to which the presence of the 
conversion privilege influences their market behavior 
under these circumstances. 
As indicated in the previous section, it is quite 
obvious that preferreds selling on conversion exhibit 
market behavior notably different from that of straight 
preferreds~. They behave more like common stocks and are 
often considered to ~ common stocks at such times. Ana~ 
at such times, the degree to which the conversion priv-
ilege is responsible for their market behavior is just 
about 100%; But what about times when the conversion 
value is below the market price of the preferred? Since 
the price of the preferred has not fallen as low as the 
conversion value, other factors than the value of the 
conversion privilege have obviously come into play~ These 
factors, of course, are those that influence straight 
preferreds -- interest rates and business conditions iru 
relation to quality. But, the question still remains: 
does the presence of the conversion privilege still con-
tinue to exert some __ influence such that the market behavior 
of the convertibles continues to vary somewhat from that 
of "straight" preferreds? 
The answer is, of course, "yes." The price of a 
preferred selling above conversion value will usually ex-
ceed its "money rate" value or investment value~ Thus, 
investors are willing to pay a "premium" for convertibles 
for the possibility of profitable conversion in the 
future even though current conversion would represent a 
loss;, The amount of this premium can be expected to vary: 
inversely with the size of the margin by which investment 
value exceeds conversion value~ The larger the margin~ 
the lower the premium, other things being equal; 
Perhaps the best way of illustrating the existence 
of this "premium" is to compare the market behavior of a 
convertible preferred with a non-convertible of the same 
company~ Table XVII presents data providing this sort 
of comparison between two preferred stock issues of Safe-
way Stores during the period 1954-1956 ~. The stockS) 
compared, Safeway Stores 4.~0% Preferred and Safeway 
Stores 4.30% Convertible Preferred, possess identical 
quality; The convertible was issued in 1954 and was 
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aonvertible during the period into 2.17 shares of common 
(conversion price = 346): 
Column (l} of Table XVII lists the high and low 
yields of the two preferreds during the period 1954-1956; 
Column (2) lists the high and low prices for the period; 
In this column the prices of the non-convertible have 
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been adjusted to reflect what the prices would have been 
had. the dividend rate of the non-convertible been 4.30% --
the dividend rate of the convertible -- instead of 4.00%r 
that is, the actual prices of the non-convertible were mul-
tiplied by a factor of 4.30/4.00. These adjusted prices 
indicate the "investment value" of the convertible since 
these prices provide, ·yields that the market demanded in 
the case of a preferred whose quality is identical to that 
of the convertible. Also included in column (2) are the 
high and low "conversion values" of the convertible (i.e., 
the high and low prices of the common stock multiplied b.y 
2~17, the number of shares obtainable by conversion)~ Col-
-
umn ( 3) gives the average premiums over investment value 
in price points: for each year~ This average premium was 
calculated by summing the amount by which the high price 
of the convertible exceeded the high price of the non-con-
vertible and the amount by which the low price of the 
convertible exceeded the low price of the non-convertible, 
and dividing this sum by 2., The high and low prices of 
the non-convertib~e were the adjusted prices which repre-
sent the "investment value" of the convertible; hence, the 
average amount by which the prices of the convertible ex-
ceeded these adjusted prices constitutes the 11average 
premium over investment value" contained in the prices of 
the convertible. Column (4) gives the same data as column 
(3) except the premiums are expressed in terms of basis; 
., 
points instead_ of price points~ 
During 1954, for the most part the conversion priv-
ilege did not give immediate value to the convertible. The 
price of the common rose above the conversion price of $46, 
but only by lt points (at the common stock high of 17!). 
Similarly, conversion value rose above par value by 3t 
points at its high of l03t. However, since the convertible 
had an investment value which exceeded par value by 7 points 
at the 1954 high of 107 (high for non-convertible as ad-
justed), the fact that conversion value rose above par 
value is less significant; that is, during a part of the 
year the convertible would have sold at a price as high as 
107 even if it had not been a convertible. 
However, even though conversion value did not rise 
above investment value, the price of the convertible did 
rise above investment value~ Even though the conversion 
factor was not operative, investors were willing to pay a 
premium of 6.38 price points on the average for the presence 
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TABLE XVII 
Comparison of 1-Iarket Behavior of Safeway S~ores 4 .305'b Convertible 
Preferred Stock and Safeway Stores 4 .OOj:i Non-convertible 
Preferred Stock, 1954-1956 
Is sue and Year ( 1) ( 2) ~{r-;:;3_,)--------,(-:4""') ___ _ 
Yield Price Average of Prem- Average of Prem-
IIigh Low High Low iums over Invest- huns over Invest-
ment Value at ment Value at 
Highs and. Lows in Highs and Lows in 
Price Points Basis Points 
;r;~ .. ;} ~~~}i~~~ 
1954 -
4 .30;; Convertible 4.16 3.83 112 1/4 103 1/8 6.38 
4.oo;~ Hen-convertible 4.50 4.02 107-l~ 95 1/2·:~ 
Safeway Common Stock 47 l/2 38 1/4 
27.50 
Conversion Value of 
Convertible~~-:~ 103 1/4 83 
1955 
4 .30;~ Conveptible 4.15 3.44 125 103 1/4 11.38 
4 .oo;s i•ion-conve~tible 4.32 4.05 106~~ 99 1/2~:· 
Safeway Cmmnon Jtock 58 1/4 42 1/b 
44.00 
Conversion Value of 
Convert:t ble·:H~ 126 91 l/2 
1956 
4 .30> Convert:l.ble 3.84 2.713 155 112 35.50 
4.U0/9 1·Ton-convertible 5.00 4.10 105·::- 86~'" 
124.00 
Safeway Co®non Stock 71 5/G 50 5/8 
Conversion Value of 
Convertible~H~ 155 110 
Source: l\Ioody 1 s Ind"LJ_strials 
TABL"E.. XVII.~( oont.) 
*The Price of the 4.00% non-convertible has been adjusted 
to reflect a dividend rate of 4.30%. 
**Safeway 4.30% convertible was convertible during thia 
period into 2.17 shares of common stock. Hence, high 
and low 11 conversion values 11 for each year we<"e deter-
mined by multiplying the high and low common stock 
prices by 2.17. 
***These "premiums over investment valuett re:(>resent the 
averages of the difference between the pr2ce of the con-
vertible ~nd the non-convertible (as adjusted) at the 
highs and lows of each, i.e., in 1954 the high price of 
the convertible exceeded the high price of the non-con-
vertible (as adjusted) by 5t price points, and the low 
price of the convertible exceeded the low price of the 
non-convertible (as adjusted) by 7 5/8 price points. 
The average of 5 l/4 and 7 5/8 is 6.38. Since the price 
of the non-convertible is used here as an indication of 
the "investment value" of the convertible, the average 
number of price points by which the convertible's price 
exceeded this price represents 11average premium over 
investment value." 
****Same calculations as column (3) except that high and 
low yields instead of high and low prices were used. 
"Premium over investment value 11 in this case is repre-
sented by the average number of basis points sacrificied 
in paying the higher prices of the convertible. 
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of the conversion privilege. Or, to say the same thing in 
terms of yield, investors were willing to sacrifice 27~50 
basis points for the possibility of future profits. 
In 1955, the prices of Safeway Common were slightly 
higher and, accordingly, the conversion value of the con-
vertible was higher on the average. And, at the higher end 
of the range, conversion value considerably exceeded the 
1955 investment value high of 106. Thus, in addition to 
the premium, investors were willing to pay for the possi-
bility of profitable conversion in the future, some of the 
premium paid during 1955 reflected the fact that the con-
version privilege was of present value~ The price of the 
convertible reached a high of 125 in 1955, a price only 
differing from the conversion value high by 1 point; in 
this region the convertible was selling on conversion. In-
vestors would have been willing to pay a price somewhat 
higher than 106 even though conversion value was below 106~ 
However, a good portion of the 19 point difference between 
106 ana125 is explained by the rise of the conversion 
. -
value above 106 and the consequent fact that the conversion 
privilege became of present value. The average premium in 
price points in 1955 exceeded that of 1954 by 5 points, an 
increase reflecting the fact that in 1955 the premium bought 
present value in addition to future value during certain 
portions of the year (when the prices of the common were 
highest). 
In 1956, conversion value never dipped below invest-
ment value. The convertible was selling on conversion 
during the whole period. The premium over investment value 
rose to 35.50 price points an the average; but none of 
this premium was paid for future conversion value. Another 
type of premium - ·premium over conversion value - de-
creased practically to 0 during 1956 •. 
To recapitulate, it has been indicated in the two 
previous sections that "converts" exhibit a price behavior 
that is different than that of "straight" preferreds; and 
this has been seen to be true regardless of the relation-
ship between conversion value and either par or investment 
value. Whether or not conversion value exceeds par or 
investment value, investors are always willing to pay more 
for this type of security than a non-convertible that is 
identical in all other respects~ 
However, the nature of the difference between the 
price behavior of convertibles and non-convertibles does 
vary: depending upon the relationship between par or invest-
ment value and conversion value~ When conversion value is 
below par or investment value, prices of convertibles ex-
hibit a price behavior over time that is similar to non-
convertibles, although the prices of the former are higher 
as of any given point in time. But when conversion value 
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increases and rises above investment value, the market 
behavior of convertibles begins to resemble the behavior 
of common stocks:-~ At earlier parts of this stage, con-
ve~ble prices can rise indefinitely, but downward move-
ments are limited by the investment value "floor". But 
as convertible prices rise higher and higher above this 
floor with further rises in the prices of the related 
common stocks, price freedom exists in both directions 
and the resemblance to common stocks is all the more 
complete. 
CHAP.J!ER Y. - PURPOSE OF ISSUE 
Introduction 
As mentioned in Chapter III, prevailing market opinion 
about the presence of a convertible feature in a fixed-
income security considers that this feature is included to 
increase the marketability of· securities that otherwise 
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could be sold at a higher coupon rate and/or larger discount.* 
The use of the word "sweetener" to describe the conversion 
option reflects this opinion.** 
The fact that convertible preferreds as a group nave 
a slightly lower quality than non-convertible preferreds 
as a group tends to support this linkage between the con-
version option and marketability. 
This chapter will not attempt to deny the validity of. 
this explanation of the existence of convertible securities. 
It will, however, introduce another point of view which 
also seems to have validity. And it is believed that this 
*As seen in Chapter IV, convertible issues sell at 
prices higher than their investment value warrants, the 
extra price being due to the premium investors are willing 
to pay ~or the possibility of conversion at a profit in 
the future. Consequently, a pre:ferre<1 stock can be sold 
at par with a lower coupon (dividend) rate Ghan a non-con-
vertible of the same quality~ 
**For example, the head of the research department o~ 
one investment management fir.m considers that the conversion 
option invariably has something to do with marketability~ 
alternative explanation may dilute somewhat the generality 
that the convertible feature is primarily used as a "sweet-
ener". 
Convertible issues o£ preferred stocks as latent issues 
of common stock 
To say that the convertible feature of a given, pre--
ferred stock is explained in terms of marketability implies 
that the issuing corporation is basically interested in 
senior security financing and adds the conversion option 
merely to increase its attractiveness at a given dividend 
But another motive behind a convertible issue might bB 
that of equity financing; Assuming that the issue is even-
tually converted into common stock, it definitely has this 
ultimate effect. This would be a roundabout means of is-
suing common stock; But, if there were advantages in this 
indirect method over direct issue of common, the senior 
security form of an issue might be perfectly consistent 
with an underlying purpose of raising equity funds. And~ 
if raising equity capital were the ultimate objective in 
the issue of a convertible senior security, then the con-
vertible feature could hardly be considered a "sweetener" 
it would be a sine qua ~~ 
And there is: a body of opinion that holds that very 
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often the ultimate intent in issuing a preferred stock 
that is convertible is not to issue preferred stock but 
to issue common stock~ The following two sections of 
this chapter take a closer look at such opinion. 
Opinion: Leonard J~ Santow 
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Leonard J. San tow wrote an article entitled "Ul. tima.te 
Demise of Preferred Stock as a Source of Corporate Capital~" 27 
The purpose of the article is to point out what he con-
siders to be the superiority of bonds over preferred 
stocks, and the "ul tima.te demise" that San tow foresees 
is due to this relationship~. This argument is not of 
immediate concern here. However, in comparing convertible 
bonds with convertible preferreds, Santow expresses an 
opinion that is of interest here, namely that the basic 
purpose of a convertible issue -- either bond or preferred 
- is to raise equity money. According to Santow: 
One must realize that the convertible feat-
ure ••• is not merely one of many convenants~ In 
actuality, it is a bridge or transitory device 
used so that a common stock issue can spring 
forth from under the mantle of a preferred stock 
or bond form~ ••. ~ 
Many authorities have put the cart before 
the horse because in actuality it is not the 
future possibility of common stock which is the 
"sweetener" for the bond or preferred stock but 
25"~antow, L~J:~ "The Ultimate Demise of Preferred 
Stock as a Source of Corporate Capital," Financial Ana.l.ysts 
Journal, May-June, 1962~ 
rather the bond or preferred stock that is the 
sweetener for the sale of a latent issue of 
common stock •.••• 
The latent common stock, therefore, is 
the substance of the issue while the bond or 
preferred stock whian encases the securit7 
is merely the for.m~26 
Thus, according to Sa.ntow, the convertible feature 
is not simply the "sweetener" for a preferred stock issue; 
its presence is necessary to permit the latent common 
stock to "spring forth". And the ultimate purpose of the 
convertible issue being the issue of common stock, the 
true "sweetener" is not the convertible feature but the 
preferred stock form. 
The question arises, however, how is a common stock 
issue "sweetened" by the use of preferred stock form: Why 
not issue common stock directly? 
In using the word "sweetener" in this context, Santow 
seems to have corporate taste buds more in mind than those 
of investors, a usage slightly different than when the 
term is used in the context of marketability.. According 
to San tow, the essential value in issuing latent common 
stock in convertible form has mainly to do with various, 
advantages realized by the corporation. Some of these ad-
vantages as listed by Santow are the following: 
1~ The initial "cost of capital" is lower than 
if the common stock were sold outright~ 
26Ib"d 
_2:_·, p~ 50 
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2~" Latent common stock can be soldwhere the 
conversion price is higher than the current market price 
of a company's common stock~ 
3~ Gradual conversion will lead to more gradual 
dilution and common stock can adjust; 
4. Since a latent common stock issue will need. 
fewer shares than a sale of outright common stock to raise 
the same amount of money, such an issue will reduce dilu-
tion of previous common shareholder's equity. 
Perhaps the most interesting and significant of these 
advantages are numbers (2) and (3). 
If, for example, a company sells a convertible issue 
convertible into common at 50 while outstanding common is 
selling at 40, then, in effect, the company is getting $10 
more per share of common than the maximum it could hope to 
get via an outright sale of common. This certainly seems 
advantageous. 
Secondly, gradual increase in shares of common out-
standing due to gradual conversion alleviates one problem 
inherent in common stock financing -- namely, the problem 
of dilution. In outright common stock financing, rate 
of return per share of additional capital raised must 
equal the rate of return per share on the old shares if 
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the stock is not to become diluted~ However, even if the 
eventual rate of return on the new investment is sufficiently 
high in this respect, in most oases this will not be true 
of the rate of return right after the investment has been 
made. In most oases, that is, there is apt to be a lag 
between the time of employment of new funds and realiza-
tion of the investment's full profit potential; it takes 
time for the new capital to begin to "earn its own way." 
Consequently, at least temporary dilution is difficult to 
avoid. 
Gradual conversion, however, gives a new investment 
time to start paying its own way. Total earnings may in-
crease slowly at first, but so does the number of shares" 
of common stock outstanding. Furthermore, during these 
early stages of low profitability, the "cost of oapita1" 
is not the higher cost of common stock, but the lower cost 
of preferred stock; 
Opinion:. Pi1oher 
Pilcher* believes that in addition to the motive of 
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increasing marketability, the desire to raise residual equity 
capital is often an important motive in the issuance of 
convertible securities. He writes: 
While many motives may lie behind the de-
cision to issue a convertible security ••• two ••• 
seem to be of major importance. These two are 
* See page 6 for initial reference~ 
(1) the desire to enhance the marketability 
of a senior security weak in some aspect of 
the contract, and (2) the desire to raise 
residual capital~27 
A survey was made by Pilcher in an attempt to deter-
mine which of these two motives was the more important; 
The survey involved one hundred companies each of which 
issued a convertible bond or preferred stock between 1948 
and 1953. Eaqh company was asked which "played the more 
important role in the decision ••• to utilize the conversion 
privilege: the desire to "sweeten" the senior leverage 
issue ••• or the desire to raise common equity ...... 28 
Sixty-nine of the companies surveyed were issuers of 
convertible preferreds (as opposed to bonds). Replies w.ere 
received from fifty-three or 77% of these companies. Qf 
these replies, 55% indicated that the primary motive behind 
their issue was to raise common capital; 29 % indicated 
that "sweetening" of the preferred stock was the primary 
motive; and the remaining 16% indicated that each motive 
was of equal importance~. 
Thus, a majority of the compani.es in the survey indi-
cated that the primary motive in issuing convertible pre-
ferreds was to raise common capital. However, the fact 
27~ilcher, .£E_~ cit., P~ 59~ 
28Ibid., p~ 60. 
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that one motive was "primary" did not always indicate that 
the other motive was not present to some degree. 
Another interesting result of this study 
was the number of times a company indicated 
that while one of the motives was more impor-
tant, the other was recognized as a lesser but 
still important factor. Twenty-five or about 
31% of those ~ueritd volunteered such a comment 
in their letters.2Y 
Pilcher, noting that the desire to raise residual 
equity capital was a primary factor in a majority of the 
corporations surveyed, offers a number of possible answers 
to the question, "why, if the objective is residual equ:i:ty 
fUnds, does the issuer bother with this indirect approach 
to the problem?"30 Several of the reasons Pilcher cites 
are similar to those mentioned in the previous section of 
this chapter: 
1. "To sell common at a price per share higher 
than current quotations on the common ••• " 
2. "To sell common on a delayed action basis in 
order to allow the new funds time to generate additional 
earnings."3l 
In addition~~.::.., Pilcher suggests several other reasons 
and summarizes them as follows~ 
29Ib.d . 
_1:.._·' p. 61-62. 
3°Ibid.' p·~ 62~, 
3libid., p~ 85~ 
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1~ To raise risk funds where a shortage of venture 
capital exists; 
2. To avoid the underpricing usually necessary im 
the sale of new common; 
3.. To minimi~e capital raising costs; 
4~ To appeal to segments of the capital market typ-
ically uninterested in residual equities; 
5~ To increase the number of common shareholders; 
6. To assure the issuer that a definite amount of 
funds will be raised.32 
Concluaicm 
The inclusion of the conversion option in preferred 
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stock contracts may very well be due to a desire to increase 
the marketability of the senior security. But in many 
cases, perhaps a majority, a more important motive may be 
that of raising equity capital~ 
32Ib. d . :· 85' 
. J. • ' p.. • 
-
Theoretical Ideal 
The principal appeal of the convertible security seems 
to be the possibility of "having one's cake and eating it 
too." If they are purchased at a price reasonably close 
to their investment value, investors have the safety of a 
senior security if stock prices decline; but if stock 
prices rise, the holder of a convertible stands in a posi-
tion to participate in this upward movement. Financial 
World Magazine puts it this way: 
Preferred stocks which may be converted 
into the common shares of the same company offer 
interesting opportunities. They afford the con-
servative investor a means of participating in 
future growth, while at the same time enabling 
him to limit considerably his market risks. 
The reasons1br this two-way advantage are 
simple. When the convertible preferred is sell-
ing on its merits as a fixed income investment, 
it cannot be affected appreciably by a decline 
in the related common. Instead, its price level 
is determined by (l) its investment quality and 
(2) prevailing interest rates. It will sell at 
or near a level that puts it on a yield basis · _-
roughly equivalent to that existing for straight 
preferreds of comparable quality. In effect~ 
therefore, there is a price floor below which 
the preferred will not go, no matter how badly 
its junior relative falters. 
But on the upside there is no ceiling; 
Appreciation in the common stock will, at a 
certain point, begin to be reflected in the 
convertible preferred~ As the conversion value 
of the common approaches the price of the 
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preferred, the latter will start to move up 
right along with the common~ 33 
Drawbacks in practice 
"All that glitters is not gold" is a maxim that seems 
to apply to the theoretical appeal of convertible secur-
ities as an ideal sort of hedge. For, in practice, there 
are several problems. 
The main problem, perhaps, is that the successful use 
of convertibles as a hedge is dependent to a considerable 
degree upon certain aspects of the price of the convert-
ible at time of purchase; and, unfortunately' these price 
conditions are not frequently satisfied. 
These conditions have to do with two aspects of the 
purchase price of the convertibles: 1) premium over in-
vestment value and 2) premium over conversion value. 
"Premium over investment value" has been discussed above* 
and involves the amount by which the price of a conver-
tible exceeds the estimated price or value the preferred 
would have if it were not convertible. Estimation of in-
vestment.value involves examination of yields of non-con-
vertibles judged to be of similar quality. This task is 
easiest when there is an outstanding non-convertible issue 
of the same company that is equally secured with the 
3J~"Twelve Attractive Convertible Preferreds," Finan-
cial World~ January 3~ 1962, p. 4. 
---- 4 see Introduction to Chapter III. 
convertible, for in such a case the quality of the two 
issues is necessarily identical~ "Premium over conversion 
value" is that amount by which the market price of a con-
vertible exceeds the conversion value of the convertible. 
"Conversion value" is, of course, determined by multiply-
ing the market price of the common stock into which a con-
vertible is convertible by the number of shares of such 
stock obtainable by conversion of one share of the conver-
tible. 
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To have protection on the downside, premium over in-
vestment value must be minimal. The higher the premium 
over the investment value the greater becomes the price 
decline to which the convertible is susceptible. On the 
other hand, premium over conversion value should also be 
minimal. For upward movements in the price of the convert-
ible only accompany upward movements in the price of the 
related common when conversion value is close to the price 
of the convertible. If the price of the preferred involves 
a large premium over conversion value the price of the re-
lated common stock can advance considerably without there 
being any corresponding advance in the convertible. 
Unfortunately, however, the smaller either of these 
two premiums is at any one time, the higher the other is 
likely to be~ Premium over investment value represents 
the price investors are willing to pay for a 
"call"* on the common. The lower the conversion value of 
a. convertible relative to the price of the preferred, the 
lower the value of this ca.ll~ Consequently, when premium 
over conversion va.J.ue is highest, premium over investment 
va.lue is likely to be lowest. On the other ha.nd, as con-
version value rises, premium over conversion va.lue dim.in-
ishes and usually disappears altogether by the time the 
convertible is selling on conversion. But during this 
rise in conversion va.lue, premium over investment value 
steadily increases~ At first the premium will increase 
due. to the greater proximity of conversion value -- the 
va.lue of the call on the common has became more valuable •. 
Later, increases in the premium over investment value re-
flects the increases in the conversion value above invest-
ment va.lue. 
Thus a low premium over investment value and a low 
premium over conversion value are seldom found together 
in the same: .. security. Without using quite the same terms, 
the Magazine of Wall Street takes note of this problem:: 
(under lining. mine) • 
Our somewhat negative view of most con-
vertible preferreds does not deny that they can 
serve a useful purpose under certain circum-
stances. Their real purpose is as a hedge, to 
* That is, purcha.se of a convertible enables an in-
vestor to obtain common stock at a fixed price (conversion 
price). 
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provide simultaneous participation in unusual 
equity profits together with protection a-
gainst loss in the case of corporate adver-
sity. And a convertible selling approximatelY: 
at its exchange ratio, at the same tiriie offer-
ing a well=protected yield on its own dividend 
that is closely compatible with yields on non-
convertible preferre.ds, does come close to 
offering a perfect hedge~ 
But t4ese conditions are not encountered 
frequently, and too many qualifications must 
be attached to any reQommendation of most con-
vertible pref:erreds~3J 
Another drawbaCk in the use of convertibles: as a hedge 
has to do with the quality of the preferred that is used 
for this purpose. That is to say, even if convertibles; 
are selected whose prices satisfy the above conditions: 
(and these are not apt to be too numerous), further selec-
tion has to be made on the basis of quality~" For, lower 
quality convertible~ are susceptible to changes in busi-
ness conditions, and, consequently, when stock prices are 
declining so very possibly will the prices of the lower 
quality preferreds. The same article quoted above from 
the Magazine of Wall Street puts the problem this way: 
" ••• many preferreds are not devoid of risk; the floor 
under them may often be rather spongy."35 And the "floor 
under them," of course, is the theoretical price floor on 
the downside. 
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3~avorable and Unfavorable Aspects of Convertible Pre-
ferreds,"" Magazine of Wall Street, November 18, 1961, p; 258. 
35Ibid., p. 258. 
Convertible preferreds not used as a hed.ge 
The attitude that the true value of convertibles is 
the hedge they afford might well be appropriate for an 
investor more interested in equity investment than in 
senior security investment. Such an investor is not in-
terested in senior securities per se so much as he is 
interested, perhaps temporarily, in a common stock alter-
native that retains as many common stock advantages and 
as few disadvantages as possible~ 
But convertible preferreds can also have an appeal 
for investors who are primarily interested in fixed-±ncome 
securities, but who certainly would not object to appre-
ciation of market value~ Such investors are not seeking 
a hedge against a market decline in common stock since 
they are not seeking an alternative to a common stock posi-
tion. On the contrary, a convertible security would be 
evaluated, for the most part, in terms of its qualities 
as a senior security. Should it be considered desirable 
in these ways, there might be a willingness to sacrifice 
some amount of yield in return for the possibility of price 
appreciation. 
Of course, the conditions that a convertible must sa-
tisfy to make it a desirable hedge must be as completely 
satisfied when the convertible is bought as an alterna-
tive to a non-convertible, at least as far as minimum 
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premiums over investment and conversion value are con-
cerned. Any premium over investment value represents a 
sacrifice in yield, a more serious consequence, perhaps, 
in terms of the objectives of a senior security investor 
than in the case of a purchaser interested primarily in 
a hedge. Furthermore, the greater the yield sacrifice 
the closer the investor comes to a speculative position. 
And, finally, the higher the premium over investment 
value, the greater the risk of price depreciation --
again, a factor of perhaps greater consequence to a senior 
security investor than for a purchaser seeking a market 
hedge. 
Minimum premium over conversion value is also impor-
tant. The investor may be willing to sacrifice some 
yield in light of the possible price appreciation. But 
since yield is of particular importance to a senior se-
curity investor, such an investor will want to get the 
most possible for his money -- and the lower the premium 
over conversion value the greater is the possibility of 
price appreciation and the sooner it is likely to occur; 
But, as above, minimum premiums of both types seldom 
go together and thus the number of convertible preferreds 
that provide a satisfactory alternative to non-convertible 
preferreds is not too large at any given time~ 
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Su:m:rna.ry and Conclusion 
Convertible preferreds are appealing either as a 
hedge against declining common stock prices or as an al-
ternative to non-convertibles if the yield sacrifice is 
not too high. The appeal in either case, but particularly 
in the latter, is or should be tempered by the size of 
the premiums over investment value and over conversion 
value. But since satisfactorily low premiums of both 
types are seldom found together in the same convertible, 
the theoretical appeal can be diminished in pr~ctice~ 
This paper is more concerned with the use of con-
vertibles as an alternative to non-convertibles than it 
is with their use as a hedge against market decline. Ac-
cordingly, Part Two, which deals with the problem of 
selection and management, will approach this area with 
the former objectives in mind; 
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PART TWO - SELE,CTION AND MANAGEMENT 
INTROOUOTION 
It is believed that convertible preferred stocks have 
a place in the senior securities section of a portfolio. 
As far as quality is concerned, convertible preferreds 
can be found that match the highest quality non-convert-
ibles. As far as yield is concerned, some sacrifice will 
practically always be involved, but if it is minimal the 
sacrifice should not be serious in the short term and 
price appreciation should more than justify it in the 
long term. As far as price behavior is concerned, proper 
selection should ensure that possible depreciation (not 
related to general price movements of senior securities 
as a whole) should be minimal, while price appreciation 
should be more than a remote possibility. 
The real issue, then, is not whether convertible pre-
ferreds as a type of security have a place in an investment 
portfolio as an alternative to non-convertibles, but what 
techniques should be employed in their selection and 
how they should be managed once purchased. Chapter VII 
will deal with the question of selection and Chapter VIII 
with the question of management; 
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As noted already in Chapters V and VI, when it comes 
to selection of convertibles, two price variables --
premium over investment and conversion value -- must be 
considered in addition to the variables that are pertin-
ent to the selection of preferred stocks in general. And 
the nature of these two price variables is such that the 
choice of desirable issues is considerably limited at 
any one time. The following chapter will go into this 
problem more intensively; a general conclusion will be 
that however acceptable convertibles may be in principle 
and in terms of quality, the price behavior of convertih~es 
serves to considerably limit the number of issues avail-
able at any one time whose prices are attrac~ive from an 
investment point of view~ 
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CHAPTER VII - SELECTION 
General Analysis 
The same techniques used in the analysis of preferred 
stocks in general should be used in analyzing convertible 
prefereds. Such factors as ratio of equity to total cap-
italization, dividend coverage, etc., are just as relevant 
in the case of convertible preferreds as in the case of 
non-convertibles. There are certain additional techniques 
that are peculiar to the analysis of convertibles; but 
these must be used in addition to techniques used in the 
case of non-convertibles and not as substitutes~ 
Consideration of the various approaches to preferred 
stock analysis is considered beyond the scope of this 
paper. Attention here will be focused on the techniques 
peculiar to convertibles~ 
Premiums over investment value and over conversion value 
Assuming that the price of a convertible will practi-
cally invariably include some premium over investment 
value, the question becomes, how high a premium is ac-
ceptable? Or to say about the same thing* in a different 
* It is not exactly the same thing because the higher 
price is not only important in terms of sacrifice in yield; 
the premium over investment value also is a measure of 
how much the price can decline. before it reaches the 
theoretical investment value floor~. 
way, how much sacrifice of yield is consistent with an 
investment position? 
One investment counsel firm believes that the pre-
mium should be less than 10%,* ·although a slightly higher 
premium might be acceptable if the purpose was to replace 
another convertible in a portfolio which in principle 
contained a certain proportion of convertibles.** 
As far as premium over conversion value is concerned, 
this same investment counsel firm believes that this pre-
mium, too, should be less than leofo~ *** 
The principle that both premiums should be less than 
10% considerably limits the field of choice from which 
to select convertibles; 
Table IYIII presents various statistics for 24 con-
vertible preferred stocks outstanding as of December 28, 
* The divisor for this calculation is the nrice of 
the security, not investment value~ The theory~is that 
the percentage premium then accurately indicates the 
percentage by which market pr~ce can decline before 
reaching the investment floor~ 
** Under such circumstances a convertible with a pre-
mium of more than 10% might be a better investment than 
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the security for which replacement was considered desir-
able. Of course, if a convertible with the desired quality, 
etc., could be found with a premium of less than 10%, this 
would be even better~ 
*** In this calculation the divisor is not market price 
but conversion value~ The theory here is that this per-
centage then accurately indicates how much the conversion 
value must increase before it equals the cost of the con-
vertible. 
1962. All 24 were listed on either the New York or Amer-
ican Stock Exchange. The basis for inclusion of these 
convertibles on this list was solely their quality as 
preferred stocks; their characteristics as convertibles 
were not considered. The li.st is a complete list of all 
convertible preferreds listed on the New York or American 
Stock Exchanges as of December 28, 1962, that received 
a rating of at least "A" by either Standard & Poor or 
Financial World Magazine; ~ formulating this list, ref-
erence was also madeto the previously reported study of 
all industrial and utility convertible preferred stocks 
listed in the 1962 edi tiona of Moody' s :&'fanuals for these . 
two types of securities. This study, it will be recalled, 
e.xamined the overall dividend coverage for all of the 
268 issues to determine which issues had a coverage of 
at least 5 times for industrials and 3 times for util-
ities in every year since 1955 in which the issue was 
outstanding; Forty-seven issues met this standard. All 
these issues that ar~listed on the New York or American 
Stock Exchange were included in the list of stocks pre-
sented in Table XVIII~ Of these issues only one, I. T. & T. 
84, Series B did not also receive a rating of "A" or 
better from either Financial World or Standard and Poor. 
Thus, of the 24 stocks included in Table XVIII only one 
stock was included solely on the basis of dividend 
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TABLE XVIII 
24 High-quality Convertible Preferred Stocks 
Outstandin1,5_ on December 28, 1962 =pr-e~f:::-e-r-r-ed-::-----------r(~l;:) ..::::.=...:(~2~)= ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) { 7 ) ( 8 ) ( 9 ) 
Par Conv. Conv. Common Con- Pfd. Est. Prem.Prem. 
Rate Price 12/28 ver- Price Inv. over over 
62 sion 12/28 Value~S.1:nv. Conv. 
Value{~< 62 Value Value 
,, "u ·~~·,\"·,~ ",, '"" "':1\"·.~· .. l"i" 
CfOJ 
Current 
Yield 
Standard Oil{Calit.-);.:3 .30 NP 
Owens-Illinois 4% ·· 100 
I,Iinneapolis-Honneywe.ll 3}b 100 
1.31 61 
1.05 95.24 73 
77stn--96-3~ 74 25;s 19;& 3 .42>~ 
1/2 77 100 1/4 91 9 30 3.90 
5/8 47 79 3/4 76 5 72 3.76 
1/4 47 88 1/2 79 11 82 4.62 
0.55 180. 84 
Allis-Chalmers 4 .08/o 100 3.333 30. 14 
5/8 68 72 45 38 6 2.78 
3/4 293 360 CJ7 73 23 1.19 
Hercules Powder \!>2 . NP 1.6 31.25 42 
Safeway Stores 4.30~ 100 6.5 15.33 45 
American J-,Ietal Climax 
4 1/4/; 100 2.5 40. 31 
Cities Service ~e4.40 NP 1.63 57 1/2 
Greyhound 4 1/2?S 50 1. 909 26.19 32 
I.T. & T. :u~4, Series B 100 1.667 60 41 7/8 
Hewmont I.:ining 4/; 100 1.111 90 65 3/4 
Permanento Cement 51o 50 2.174 23 12 7/8 
Pittston ~3.50 75 1.787 59 
Scher inc; 5/G . 30 0. 545 50 40 5/8 
United Aircraft 4/o(l956) lUO 1.5 66.67 51 3/8 
United Aircraft 4/i(l955) 100 2.1 47.50 51 3/8 
Consolidated Edison 4.12;; 100 1.25 80 83 3/8 
Lone Star Gas 4 .84;a 100 6. 16.67 22 3/G 
Pacific Lighting (?4.75 NP 2.6 60 5/8 
So. Cal. Edison 4 .56;J 25 2.875 30 3/4 
So. Cal. Edison 4.4Bc 25 2.674 30 3/4 
Laclede Gas 4 .32/b ' 25 1. 5 16.67 27 5/8 
Beneficial li'inance ~~4.50 100 2. 50. 50 1/2 
78 
94 
61 
70 
73 
28 
105 
22 
77 
108 
105 
134 
158 
88 
82 
,12 
101 
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. 
3 l/'21b ~.. ~··. . 100 l~.,_E)_ ~ - _6 2 • ~0 _5.?_ _1/ 8 83 
102 
107 
62 
100 
95 
55 
3/8 
1/2 
1/2 
105 1/2 
33 
102 
115 
110 
140 
158 
87 
80 
43 
116 
98 
1/4 
1/4 
1/2 
92 
97 
44 
89 
89 
45 
70 
31 
80 
80 
92 
97 
100 
24 
24 
23 
96 
81 
10 
9 
29 
11 
7 
18 
34 
6 
22 
30 
18 
37 
37 
72 
70 
47 
18 
18 
26 
14 
2 
44 
31 
97 
0.5 
50 
33 
6 
5 
4 
0 
-1 
-2 
2 
15 
18 
4.15 
4.11 
3.62 
3.90 
4.22 
4.54 
3.33 
4.54 
3.91 
3.48 
3.73 
3.46 
3.00 
1.31 
1.39 
2.52 
3.98 
3.57 
TABLE. DIII (Cont. ) 
*Column (2) times Column (4) 
**"Estimated Investment Value" is an estimation of the 
price the converti~e would sell at if it were not 
convertible. Some of these estimates were taken from 
the R.H.M. Convertible Survey, November 16, 1962. 
Others represent estimates of the author based upon 
yields of non-convertibles judged to be of similar 
quality. 
*** Column (6) - Column (7) 
Column (6) 
**** Column ( 6) ....: Column ( 5) 
Column (5) 
SOURCE: Columns (1) - (4) and (6): Various current publica-
tions~ 
Column ( 7) :: Some of these estimates come from the 
R.H.M. Convertibil.e Survey, November 16, 1962. 
Others are those of the author. 
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coverage as determined in the above-mentioned study~ 
To recapitulate, the 24 convertible preferred stocks 
listed in Table XVIII are a complete list of all conver-
tible preferred stocks listed on the New York or American 
Stock Exchange that: 
1) received a rating of at least "A" by Stan-
dard and Poor; 
2) received a rating of at least "A" by 
Finan.cial World Magazine~ 
3) that satisfied certain dividend coverage 
requirements as determined by a study of 268 industrial 
and public utility convertible preferred stocks. 
Most of the columns of Table XVIII are self-explan-
atory. "Conversion Value" was obtained by multiplying 
"Conversion Rate" by the price of the common stock as of 
December 28, 1962. "Premium over Investment Value" waa 
determined by the formula; 
Preferred Price - Investment Value 
Preferred Price. 
"Premium: over Conversion Value" was determined by the 
formula: 
Preferred Price - Conversion Value 
Conversion Value. 
"Investment Value" was the only estimated statistic. 
The estimation was easiest and most accurate in the case 
of those companies that had. "straight" preferreds of 
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identical ~uality also outstanding on December 28:* The 
calculation for other stocks involved observation of yields 
on preferreds of like quality issued by companies in sim-
ilar industries. The R.H.J. Convertible Survey publishes 
estimated "investment values" for some convertible pre-
ferreds, and this source was used as a guide in some cases 
and used as a direct source in others~36 
The interesting thing about Table XVIII is the fact 
that ~ of the issues had premiums over investment 
value and over conversion value that were less than 10% 
in both cases. Six of the 24 had premiums over investment 
value of 10% or less, and ten of the 24 had premiums over 
conversion valne that were less than 10%. But, again, no 
issues had premiums of both types that were 10% or less:. 
As further illustration of the fact that a low pre-
mium of one type goes together with a high premium of the 
other type,, the premiums for certain issues can be com-
pared. Minneapolis Honeywell had the lowest premium over 
investment value -- only 5%~ But its premium over conver-
sion value was 72%, a premium only exceeded in the case 
of two other issues. Conversely, the two Southern Cali-
fornia Edison convertibles had the lowest premiums over 
* This was possible in the case of Safeway Store~, 
Pacific Lighting and Laclede Gas. 
36The R.H.M. Convertible Survey. New York, R.H.M., 
Associates, November 16, 1962. 
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conversion value; in fact they were selling at a slight 
discount below conversion value. However, the corres-
ponding premiums over investment value, 70% and 72%, were 
the 2nd and 3rd highest premiums exhibited by the 24 stocks. 
The most attractively priced issue is Cities Service 
$4.40, with a premium over investment value a£ 9% and a 
premium over conversion value of 14%. Purchase of this 
convertible would involve a yield sacrifice of only 42 
basis points. And the conversion value is close enough 
to the price of the convertible to make price appreciation 
of the convertible likely should the Cities Service Common 
experience even a modest gain. 
conclusion 
It is believed that minimum premiums of both types: 
are desirable when convertible preferreds are purchased 
as alternatives to non-convertible preferreds. The 10% 
maximum used by one investment counsel firm seems reason-
able. 
However, high-quality convertible preferreds that 
are attractively priced in these terms are apt to be hard 
to find as of a given date~ An investor on December 28, 
1962 would not have been able to find a single high-qual-
ity issue (listed on the New York or American Stock Ex-
change) that had a premium of each type that was 10% or 
less. 
CHAPTER Vlli,- MANAGEMENT 
Ones convertible preferreds have been selected and 
included in a given portfolio, the problem arises as to 
how they should be managed. If their market price appre-
ciates, how long should they be allowed to appreciate? 
If the decision is not to retain them, should they be 
sold or converted? And, if they are not sold or converted 
after price appreciation, should they be considered part 
of the senior security portion of a portfolio or the com-
mon stock portion? 
Graham, Dodd and Cottle 
Graham, Dodd and Cottle have some interesting views 
regarding the question of retention o~ convertibles that 
have appreciated:; 
Although there is indeed no upper limit 
to the price that a convertible ••• may reach, 
a very real limitation is set on the amount 
of profit that the holder may realize while 
still maintaining an investment position. 
After a privileged issue bas advanced with 
the common stock, its price becomes dependent 
in both directions upon changes in the stock 
quotation, and to that extent the continued 
holding of the senior securities becomes a 
speculative operation •• ~ 
The unlimitedprofit possibilities of a 
privileged issue are thus in an important 
sense illusory. They must be identified not 
with the ownership of a bond or preferred 
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stock but with the assumption of a common 
stockholder's position •••• Practically speak-
ing, the range of profit possibilities for a 
convertible issue, while maintaining the ad-
vantm of an investment holding, must usually 
ce 1 ted to somewhere3between 25 and. 35 per cent of its face value. 7 
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This point of view seems to have merit. If the con-
vertible is originally purchased as an investment primaril~ 
on the basis of its value as a fixed-income security (a 
slight sacrifice of yield may have been accepted but 
ideally only a slight one) then it would seem inconsistent 
to keep the security after it has appreciated to the 
point that its behavior resembles that of a common stock. 
Graham and Dodd are also of the opinion that after 
a convertible has appreciated in price out of the invest-
ment range (25-35%) the issue should be sold, not con-
verted. Their argument is as follows: 
When the investor does exchange his sen-
ior issue for the stock, he abandons the prior 
claims to principal and interest upon which 
the purchase waw originally premised. If 
after the conversion is made things should go 
badly, his shares may aecline in value far 
below the original cost of his senior issue, 
and he will lose not onlf3~is profit but part of his principal as well.~ · 
37Graham, B., Dodd, D. L., and Cottle s., .2.E.• cit~ 
pp. 603-604. ---
38Ibid.' p. 607. 
Here again, the pr~ciple of selling rather than con-
verting is based upon the premise that the convertible 
was originally purchased primarily upon the basis of its 
value as a fixed-income security. Thus, for the same 
reason that the convertible should not be held aZter its 
price appreciates out of the investment range, it would 
be similarly inconsistent to convert the issue into com-
mon rather than selling it. 
Approach of an investment counsel firm 
It was mentioned above that one investment counsel 
firm considered it desirab~e in purchasing convertible 
preferreds that the price premiums over investment and 
conversion value should be 10% or less in each case. And 
their reasoning is that the convertible should be pur-
chased primarily on the basis of its qualifications as 
a fixed-income security; Some price premium over invest-
ment value and some yield sacrifice is justified in light 
of possible appreciation;* but too high a premium and 
sacrifice in yield would be inconsistent with an invest-
. 
ment position. 
* And this price for possible appreciation should 
"buy" as much as possible~ That is, the premium over 
conversion value should be at a mjnjmum thereby increas-
ing the likelihood of price appreciation. 
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This same investment counsel firm has certain poli-
cies regarding management of a convertible that has ap-
preciated. If a convertible appreciates to the point 
where the premium is 30% or more, it is considered a 
common stock. It is considered part of the common stock 
portion of a portfolio and subsequent analysis of the 
issue is on this basis. At this point the convertible 
is only as attractive as the common stock into which it 
is convertible -- it has lost its attractiveness as a 
senior security. 
If a convertible appreciates beyond 20% but not be-
yond 30% it is not automatically transferred to the common 
stock portion of a portfolio~ But common stock attributes 
are nevertheless recognized by limiting the extent to 
which the value of convertibles in this range and the 
value of common stocks taken together can exeeed the pro-
portion of the total value of the portfolio that is con-
sidered a maximum for comm~n stocks alone. 
It should be noted that this investment counsel firm 
does not necessarily sell convertibles whose price has, 
appreciated to the extent that premium over investment 
value exceeds 30%. On the other hand, they are only kept 
if the related common stock looks promising; their one-
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time value as a senior security is at this point disregarded~ 
It is interesting to note that the upper limit to 
retention of a convertible in the senior security portion 
of a portfolio -- 29% premium over investment value --
falls within the 25-35% range suggested by Graham, Dodd, 
and Cottle as the maximum appreciation :permissible "while 
maintaining the advantage of an investment holding;"39* 
Conclusion 
Assuming that a convertible is initially purchased 
:primarily on the basis of its attractiveness as a fixed-
income security and not on the basis of its attractiveness 
as a common stock commitment, then it would s.eem consis-
tent in terms of original objectives to disinvest** when 
:price appreciation leads to a :price :premium over invest-
ment value of 30% or more. For, at this point the market 
behavior of the convertible is more like that of a common 
stockt and if the security is of present value, it is as 
a common stock, not as a senior security. 
39Ib.d 
....:.2:._·' 
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* The figures are not directly comparable, for G.D.&C' s_ 
percentages are based on face value, not investment value. 
** Transfer to the common stock :portion of a portfolio 
would accomplish the same thing; 
CONCLUSION 
From the point of view of general availability, there 
seems to be no shortage of convertible preferreds. One 
out of every five preferred stocks listed on the New York 
or American Stock Exchange in April, 1962, were convert-
ible issues. And this is an understatement since convert-
ible issues "disappear" from the market at a faster rate 
than non-convertibles. 
And there seems to be no shortage of high quality 
preferreds. True, the average quality of outstanding 
convertibles is lower than the average quality of non-
convertibles. Nevertheless, 17.5% of the convertible pre-
ferred stocks listed on the New York or American Stock 
Exchange in April, 1962, received a rating of "A+ 11 or 11A11 
by Financial World Magazine. And this figure is an under-
statement, too. For the turnover of high quality con-
vertibles is .higher than that of the lower quality issues. 
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Apart from statistics about the quality of outstand-
ing issues, the corporate motive behind the inclusion o£ 
conversion options in new issues seems not to be exclusively 
one of marketability; consequently, poorer quality and 
convertibility are not necessarily opposite sides of the 
same coin. Corporations have plenty of reason to issue 
convertible securities for purposes other than sweetening 
issues that would be unattractive if not convertible; 
But if convertible preferreds can not be discounted 
in terms of general availability or quality, problems 
arise when it comes to selection at an attractive price~ 
To be suitable for investment purposes, a price more than 
slightly higher than the price the convertible would sell 
at ex-convertibility is not acceptable. Yet when this 
premium is at a desirable minimum, conversion value is 
apt to be so low that even this minimum is too high in 
terms of "value received". 
One investment counsel firm considered it desirable 
that the price of the convertible should not include a 
premium over investment value of more than 10% and that 
conversion value should not have to rise more than 10% 
to equal the price paid for a convertible. However, out 
of 24 investment grade convertible preferreds listed on 
the New York and American Stock Exchanges as of December 
28, 1962, not one satisfied these requirements. 
Thus, the general conclusion of this paper is that 
as of any given moment the number of convertible pre-
ferreds available on attractive terms for inclusion in 
the senior securities pDrtion of a portfolio is consider-
ably limited. In principle, however, attractively priced, 
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high quality convertibles are considered an appealing 
addition to a senior security commitment, and it seems 
desirable for an investor to be alert for possible op-
portunities in the convertible area. 
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